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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
WALLACE R. SMITH, dba SMITH
REALTY COMPANY,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs-

Case No. 8302

C. TAYLOR BURTON,
Defendant ·and Respondent

REPLY BRIEF OF RESPONDENT AND CROSS
APPELLANT ON PETITION FOR REHEARING

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This Brief is filed in reply to the Petition for
Rehearing and Brief In Support Thereof, filed by
plaintiff and in opposition thereto.
Throughout this Brief, appellant will be referred to as plaintiff, and respondent and cross appellant will be referred to as defendant. All italics
are ours.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
In the interest of brevity, defendant respectfully refers the court to the Statement of Facts set
forth in his original brief in this matter, for a full
recital of the facts involved in this case.
POINTS RELIED UPON.
POINT I.
THIS COURT HAS CORRECTLY APPLIED
AND CONSTRUED THE PAROL EVIDENCE
RULE IN THIS CASE, IN REVERSING THE
JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT AWARDING PLAINTIFF A $2,000.00 JUDGMENT
AGAINST DEFENDANT.
ARGUMENT POINT I.
Plaintiff charges that this court has fallen into
error in considering the parol evidence rule as a rule
of evidence, instead of a rule of substantive law,
and implies that the court was unfamiliar with the
Utah case of Farr vs. Wasatch Chemical Company,
105 Utah 272, 143 P. 2d, 281.
We assert that this court was dead right in this
matter and that its decision is in entire harmony
with the holding in the Farr case. It is hard to
understand how plaintiff can get such comfort out
of the Farr decision, since it in no way supports his
theory in this matter. The Farr case and the case
at bar are clearly distinguishable on the facts, and
the law enunciated in the Farr case only fortifies
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this court in its decision in this case. It is there
held "The principle that parol evidence is not admissable to contradict, add to, or vary the terms of
a written contract. The rule is, of course, well
established, but, it has no application here. * * *
Here the alleged oral agreement does not in any way
attempt to vary or contradict the terms of the written agreement." The court then pointed out that
the lease in the Farr case did not purport to deal,
in any way, with the matter of making the premises
ready for occupancy, but only had to do with the,
rental and care of the premises after occupancy. It
allowed oral evidence regarding the agreement of
the landlord to make repairs before the tenant took
over, but it rejected oral testimony regarding an
elevator, since the agreement required the tenant
to keep the premises in repair after occupancy, and
the court held that "if a particular element of an
alleged extrinsic negotiation is dealt with at all in
a writing, presumably the writing was meant to
represent all of the transaction on that element, and
parol evidence is inadmissible thereon."
In the Farr case there was no mention, whatever, in the lease, of the matter as to which parol
evidence was admitted. It was an entirely different
matter, not expressly nor impliedly covered by the
writing. We have no fault with that holding on the
facts involved.
But our case is something else again. We have
our subject covered in Exhibit 7 namely, a commission to be paid plaintiff. It is an integrated agreement, complete, clear and unambiguous.· Within its
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four corners are found the entire agreement of the
parties on the subject covered. It was entered into
by two experienced business men of more than ordinary intelligence. Smith, especially, is a veteran
real estate salesman, accustomed to making all sorts
of unusual commission agreements, according to
his own testimony. He testified that defendant had
no money and would only agree to the Toone exchange on the basis of the commission agreement
set forth in Exhibit 7. Plaintiff very much wanted
to get a deed to his duplex, which he could do only
when the remaining two duplexes were disposed of
and he felt sure he could rent the pasture. He had
plenty of reason and motive to enter into this contingent fee agreement. For a more full discussion
of this being a contingent fee agreement, and for
authorities supporting such view, the court is respectfully referred to Point I of Defendant's Original
Brief, beginning at page 7.
Plaintiff states that Exhibit 7 does not cover the
contingency which arose, i.e.: That enough money
was not received to pay plaintiff $2,000.00 commission. We can't think he is serious in this contention.
Plaintiff was entitled only to such commission, if any,
as might be affirmatively agreed upon. They approached this subject affirmatively by saying that
"as my commission * * * I will take one-half of the
rental fee * * *." Now it was not necessary to go
on and state negatively, in substance, "But if no rent
is received, I will get no commission." The law implies this negative result. In other words, plaintiff
started with no rights to commission from defendant
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and became entitled thereto only to the extent provided in this special agreement, and that consisted
of one-half of the 1953 rent. There was no rent,
hence no commission became due.
Counsel for plaintiff is a man of great experience at the bar, and I feel certain that in contingent
fee agreements he has drawn, he has approached
the rna tter in the same manner as was done in this
case, i.e.: By stating affirmatively what contingent
fee is to be, how payable, etc., but has not gone on
to state negatively that if he makes no recovery, he
is to get no fee. At least that is my practice and
that of many others I know. The thing I am amazed
at is that two laymen could, in so few words, write
such a clear and complete agreement, leaving nothing in doubt.
On what subject does plaintiff endeavor to have
parol evidence considered? Obviously, on the subject of the commission due him. Yet, isn't this the
very subject treated in Exhibit 7? Is it a distinct,
different or collateral matter? Clearly not! Does
plaintiff contend that the thing he seeks to prove by
parol evidence would not contradict, add to or vary
the terms of a written instrument, which the Farr
case, supra, says may not be done? Of course not.
As this court so well says. It is the very "antithesis
of the plain terms of the memorandum," Exhibit 7.
The whole heart, meaning and substance of Exhibit
7 would be destroyed. So far as we are aware, the
decisions are unanimous that this cannot be done.
The court has no power to write a new contract for
the parties, and will not permit parol evidence to
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destroy the plain, clear agreement of the parties,
embodied in writing. At 12 Am. Juris. 749, it is
thus stated :
"Interpretation of an agreement does not
include its modification or the creation of a
new or different one. A court is not at liberty
to revise an agreement while professing to
construe it. Nor does it have the right to
make a construction for the parties."
Whether the parol evidence rule be considered
one of evidence or of substantive law, all courts
would reject the offer of plaintiff's parol evidence
in this case, since it would completely alter a written
instrument, which speaks on the same subject and
which obviously was intended as the agreement of
the parties. The courts have said that if parol evidence is conditionally admitted to show the conditions surrounding the making of a written instrument, and, is found to vary, modify or add to the
terms of the writing on the same rna tter, such parol
evidence will be rejected. That, certainly is the case
here.
In Fox Film Corporation vs. Ogden Theatre
Company, 17 Pac. (2d) 294, 90 A.L.R. 1299, the
court has said :
"In the absence of fraud, or mistake, parol
evidence is not admissable to contradict,
vary, add to, or subtract from the terms of a
valid written instrument which purports to
set forth the entire contract of the parties."
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To the same general effect see 20 Am. Juris. 958,
963, 968, 989, 990, 991 and 12 Am. Juris. 755, 756,
757, and 758. At page 991 of 20 Am. Juris. is the
following:
"A written agreement dealing with the
amount, time and manner of payment is
ordinarily conclusively to be presumed to embody all that element of the oral negotiation."
At 12 Am. Juris. 758, is the following:
"A written contract may properly be
varied by an oral agreement only when it is
collateral, is not inconsistent with express or
implied conditions of the written contract,
and is one which the parties could not reasonably be expected to embody in the writing."
Can it be said in this case that plaintiff's offered
oral agreement is collateral to the written one and
that it is not inconsistent with the expressed and
implied conditions thereof and that it is one which
the parties could not reasonably be expected to have
embodied in the writing? The answer is "no" to
each proposition.
One of the best discussions of this whole subject is found in 70 A.L.R. beginning at page 752,
where an array of cases from all jurisdictions is assembled.
"To allow a party to lay the foundation
for oral evidence by oral testimony that only
part of the agreement was reduced to writing,
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and then prove by parol the part omitted
would be to work in a circle and to permit the
very evil which the rule was designed to prevent." Thompson vs. Libby, 34 Minn. 374; 26
N.W .. l.
Bearing on the argument of plaintiff that the
drawing of Exhibit 8 by plaintiff is evidence of intent of the parties and should be admitted in evidence, we find in Fentriss vs. Steele, 110 Va. 578;
66 S.E. 870, that the court says that parol evidence
cannot be admitted to prove a contemporaneous
agreement that a written instrument, on its face
unambiguous and complete, should be considered
only as a basis or outline of a contract to be filled
out subsequently with stipulations other than those
stated in the writing.
In Dawson County State Bank vs. Durland, 114
Neb. 605; 209 N.W. 243, the court adopts the doctrine that
"The test of the completeness of a written
contract is the writing itself and parol evidence to show that it is incomplete is not
competent."
At 70 A.L.R. 759, we find the following: In the
New York court in a comparatively recent case
(Mitchell vs. Lath, 160 N.E. 646; 68 A.L.R. 239)
the court has laid down these conditions which, it
is said, must exist before an oral agreement may be
shown to vary the written contract, viz: (1) the
oral agreement must be in form a collateral one;
( 2) it must not contradict express or implied proviSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9

sions of the written contract; ( 3) it must be one
that parties would not ordinarily be expected to embody in the writing. See also 12 Am. Juris 758.
Plaintiff in our case not only fails to meet all
three of these requirements, but actually meets not
a single one of them.
To the same general effect see the pronouncement of the U.S. Supreme Court in Seitz v. Brewers'
Refrigerating Machinery Company, 141 U.S. 510;
35 L. Ed. 837, where a written contract is silent
as to a particular matter (in this case time of payment), and the law supplies the omission, parol evidence is not admissable to show a particular date
for payment alleged to have been agreed upon, since
this would be to vary the written contract. Cliver
v. Heil, 95 Wis. 364; 70 N.W. 346.
In his second ground for a rehearing, plaintiff
cries out loudly that the decision "deprives plaintiff,
without any justification of commission which in
equity and good conscience were due him and in effect creates a penalty and forfeiture."
One can suffer a forfeiture only of something
one has or is legally entitled to. In this case we have
conclusively shown that plaintiff did not become enti tied to any commission, because he was to be paid
only if he rented the pastures, which he failed to do.
The simple fact is, the contingency which would entitle him to a commission never occurred and he just
didn't qualify for a commission. How then can he
accuse this court of depriving him without justification of commissions or of levying a penalty? Does
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counsel feel that in an accident case which he has
on a contingent fee basis, that he has been deprived
without justification of a fee, because he does not
win his case? Nothing was due plaintiff "in equity
and good conscience" unless he became entitled
legally to a commission, and this court has rightly
decided that he is not so entitled.
This court has not misconstrued or ignored the
parol evidence rule or its proper application to this
case, as charged by plaintiff, but, on the contrary,
has properly applied said rule, as announced, in the
Farr case, supra, and other leading authorities, and
in so doing has concluded that whether it be a rule
of evidence or of substantive law still the admission
of the parol evidence to sustain the finding of the
lower court would add to, vary and modify the terms
of a written agreement, Exhibit 7, and is so inconsistent therewith, that such parol evidence cannot
be received under the most liberal construction of
said agreement. Therefore the decision reversing
the judgment of the lower court is right and proper.
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POINT II.
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR A COMMISSION
IS VOID UNDER OUR STATUTE OF FRAUDS,
UNLESS HE CAN BRING IT UNDER THE
WRITrrEN AGREEMENT, EXHIBIT 7.
ARGUMENT POINT II.
As pointed out in defendant's original Brief,
plaintiff is stopped at the threshold, by the provisions of our Statute of Frauds, Section 25-5-4, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, which provides:
"Every agreement authorizing or employing an agent or broker to purchase or sell
real estate for compensation"
shall be void unless in writing. An earlier statute,
identical in wording, was construed by this court in
the case of Case v. Ralph, 188 Pac. 640, as requiring
that a real estate broker, if he is to recover at all,
must base his claim on a written instrument covering all terms of h1s employment, showing his authority to sell, the amount, terms, and consideration
upon which his commission is to be paid. Under
that holding plaintiff must recover, if at all, under
the terms of the written agreement, Exhibit 7, and
not under the parol agreement which he seeks to
prove. This salutary statute was passed to prevent
just such an attempt as is here made to claim a
broker's commission on flimsy, contradictory, and
often poorly remembered parol agreements. It appears that plaintiff is stopped in this case, which-
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ever way he turns. If he stays with the written contract, Exhibit 7, as he must do under the law, then
he became entitled to no commission and if he attempts, as he is doing, to vary its terms by alleging
a parol agreement, then he encounters this provision
of our statute which makes void such parol agreement.
POINT III.
NO SUFFICIENT GROUND FOR A REHEARING HAS BEEN SHOWN BY PLAINTIFF
AND HIS PETITION THEREFORE SHOULD BE
DENIED.
ARGUMENT POINT III.
This court has consistently and repeatedly ruled
that to justify a rehearing a strong case must be
made. It is thus stated in Brown v. Pickard, a Utah
case at 11 Pac. 512:
"We long ago laid down the rule that to
justify a rehearing, a strong case must be
made. We must be convinced that the court
failed to consider some material point in the
case, or that it erred in its conclusions or
that some matter had been discovered which
was unknown at the time of the hearing.
* * * When a case has been fully and fairly
considered, in all its bearings, a rehearing
will be denied."
To the same effect: In re MacKnight, 9 Pa. 299.
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It is put thusly in the Utah case of Ducheneau
vs. House, 11 Pac. 618:
"We have repeatedly called attention to
the fact that no rehearing will be granted
where nothing new or important is offered
for our consideration. We again say that
we cannot grant a rehearing unless a strong
showing therefor is made. A re-argument,
or an argument with the Court upon the
points of the decision, with no new light
given, is not such showing."
In Cunningham, et al, vis. Scott, et al, 11 Pac.
619, the court observes:
"A defeated party usually feels that the
decision is not good law, but that furnishes
no ground for a rehearing."
Judge Frick in the case of Cummings, et ux, vs.
Nielson, et al, 129 Pac. 619 in writing the opinion
denying a petition for rehearing stated the disposition of this court in the following language :
"When this court, however, has considered and decided all of the material questions involved in a case, a rehearing should
not be applied for, unless we have misconstrued or overlooked some material fact or
facts, or have overlooked some statute or decision which may effect the result, or that
we have based the decision on some wrong
principle of law, or have either misapplied or
overlooked something which materially affects the result. In this case nothing was
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done or attempted by counsel, except to reargue the very propositions we had fully
considered and decided. If we should write
opinions on all the petitions for rehearing,
filed, we should have to devote a very large
portion of our time in answering counsel's
contentions a second time ; and if we should
grant rehearings because they are demanded
we should do nothing else save to write and
rewrite opinions in a few cases. Let it again
be said that it is conceded, as a matter of
course, that we cannot convince losing counsel that their contentions should not prevail,
but in making this concession let it also be
remembered that we, and not counsel, must
ultimately assume all responsibility with respect to whether our conclusions are sound
or unsound."
We submit that plaintiff has presented no new
points which were not in the original briefs or orally
argued to the court in the first instance, and that
all points now raised were considered by the court
in arriving at its decision. Plaintiff has simply
charged, with nothing to support it, that the Court's
decision contains a basic misapplication and misconstruction of the Parol Evidence Rule. Yet,
the exact opposite is shown by the Court's decision.
It points out, in substance, that it has considered the
finding of the lower court to the effect that in any
event defendant was to pay plaintiff the commission
by November 1, 1953, which could be made only on
the basis of the parol evidence, and finds that such
finding would so vary the terms of the written agreement, Exhibit 7, that it is inadmissible under the
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parol evidence rule, whether such rule be considered
as a rule of evidence or as a rule of substantive law.
This is in line with the undisputed law.
The only other point made by plaintiff is a restatement of his contention, made in his original
brief, and orally argued to the court, that he should
be given a judgment because he alleges that the
fences were not as he would have liked them. This
court's decision shows that it has considered this
matter, which it correctly disposes of in this language:
"There was testimony of plaintiff to the
effect that defendant failed to repair a fence
so that plaintiff could not rent the pastures.
Plaint~ff did not plead excuse for non-performance but defendant's hindrance or prevention, asked for no amendment of his
pleadings to conform to such proof, and the
lower court obviously was unimpressed with
such theory since it made no finding to that
effect.
How can plaintiff say this court ignored the
fence question? It clearly did not, but held that
plaintiffs' pleadings would not support a judgment
on that theory and that the lower court was so unimpressed that it didn't make any sort of finding on it.
Plaintiff himself placed no importance on this
theory, because at page 2 of his original brief, he
states that his claim consists of "Two Thousand
Dollars was claimed under a memorandum agreement which is marked Exhibit 7 * * *," and at page
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4 says "The court found that defendant was indebted to plaintiff for the Two Thousand Dollars
represented by the memorandum contained in Exhibit 7."
Certainly the lower court's findings are based
solely on a construction of Exhibit 7 and on the
further finding that it was the understanding of the
parties that the commission would be paid in any
event by November 1st, which latter finding is, we
submit, without a scintilla of evidence to support it.
One will search the record in vain for any testimony
fixing November 1st as a date for payment. The
court made no finding regarding fences or any excuse for non-performance by plaintiff and certainly
no judgment could be supported upon any such
theory in the absence of any such finding.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

17
CONCLUSION.
It is respectfully submitted that this court properly applied the parol evidence rule in its decision;
that plaintiff has failed to show sufficient grounds
for the granting of his petition for rehearing, and
that same should be denied, and the decision of this
court allowed to stand as written.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON ROMNEY and ROMNEY & NELSON
Counsel for Respondent and Cross-Appellant
Received three copies of the foregoing Brief
this __________ day of September, 1955.
RAWLINGS, WALLACE, ROBERTS
& BLACK and DWIGHT L. KING,

Counsel for Appellant.
By ------------------------------------------------------·----------Respectfully submitted.
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